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IN THE SUPKEME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAX W. YOUNG, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v s . 
WYCOFF COMPANY, INC. , et al . , 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE NO. 14488 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plain tiffs -Appellan t s , hereinafter referred to as "Young," are minority 
shareholders in the four (4) defendant companies, Wycoff Company, Incorporated, 
"Company"; Wycoff Warehouse, I n c . , "Warehouse"; Wycoff Corporation, "Cor-
poration"; Mountain Service, Inc. , "Mountain Service". Respondent Zions First 
National Bank, "Zions" , was Executor of the estate and appointed Trustee under 
the Last Will and Testament of Milton Stanley Wycoff, often referred to herein 
as M. S. Wycoff or "Slim" Wycoff. Young asked in the Complaint for: (a) an 
order directing defendant Zions to "redeem" certain voting stock to the other 
defendants, alleging an agreement of April 26, 1965, among Max W. Young, M. 
S. Wycoff and others; (b) an accounting by defendant Zions with respect to its 
dividend, distribution and debt relationships with the other defendants; (c) 
appointment of a receiver for defendants Company, Warehouse, Corporation and 
\ 
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Mountain Service; (d) judgment that defendants Company, Warehouse, Corporation 
and Mountain Service be dissolved, wound up and their assets distributed; and 
(e) judgment against the defendants because of alleged wrongful discharge and 
removal of plaintiff Max Young from the management and board of directors of 
the various Wycoff corporations, together with damages in the amount of $120 ,000.00 
for alleged lost compensation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was tr ied before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District J u d g e , 
who entered Findings of Fact and Judgment on January 26, 1976, in favor of 
defendants and against plaintiffs, "no cause of action" on all claims; and awarded 
defendants their costs . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plain tiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the District Court , 
entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claims, and such other and relief 
as this court deems proper . Defendants-Respondents u rge that the Findings 
are all supported by competent evidence and that the Judgment be affirmed. \ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The transcript of the trial below was abstracted by order of this Court , 
and references hereinafter where possible are to both the original t ranscr ipt 
( T r . ) and the abstract thereof (Ab.) . It is believed that the Statement of Facts 
set forth in Appellants' brief is incomplete and inadequate, so this expanded 
recitation of facts is offered as foundational for purposes of meaningful legal 
analysis . 
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M . S . Wycoff founded the defendant Wycoff corporations and served as 
their President and General Manager until his death in 1966. From a single half-
ton truck operation starting in Helper, Utah, in 1953 (Tr. 450, Ab. 147) , Wycoff 
created four integrally connected companies which conducted business the basic 
aspects of which consisted of hauling commodities, express service , warehousing, 
and sales of dynamite suppl ies , as follows: 
1. Wycoff Company , Incorporated (Company) conducted an interstate 
and intrastate motor car r ie r service involving the states of Utah , Idaho, Colorado, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Wyoming and Arizona, with a supplies division engaged 
in marketing mining suppl ies . 
2. Mountain Service, Inc. (Mountain Service) was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Company. Its function was to own, repair and maintain the t r u c k s , 
tractors and trai lers operated by Company under lease. Some 450 such units 
were in service by Company at the time of t r ia l . Since the t r i a l , this subsidiary 
has been merged into Company. 
3 . Wycoff Warehouse, Inc. (Warehouse) owned and operated three 
warehouses and an office building in Salt Lake City, Utah, including delivery
 x 
services from the warehouses. 
4. Wycoff Corporation (Corporation) owned and maintained realty in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, including four warehouses and the office building on South 
300 West, where Company has its offices. 
Max W. Young was hired as a stenographer in January 1950, by Mr. Wycoff, 
and subsequently advanced to other responsibilit ies. As the years went along, 
- 3 -
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Mr. Wycoff gave to Mr. Young and members of his family almost all of the 25% 
of the voting stock in Company , Warehouse, and Corporation, which was acquired 
by plaintiffs , and one qualifying share in Mountain Service. Mr. Wycoff developed 
terminal leukemia (Tr . 490 , Ab . 161) . During the last three years of his life, 
Mr. Wycoff gave more executive responsibilities to Mr. Young, but Mr. Wycoff 
remained active in the daily operations of the bus iness , as President of all four 
companies, until very shortly pr ior to his demise in 1966. 
Mr. Wycoffs Will was duly admitted to probate in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, and Zions was appointed as Executor. The Will provided for 
distribution of the estate to Zions as Trustee for Mr. Wycoffs widow and son. 
Mrs . Wycoff was not active in the bus ines s , and for the most part non-voting 
stock and debentures issued by Company, Corporation and Warehouse were assigned 
to the Martial Trust for he r benefit. The Will provided for distribution by Zions, 
as Trus tee , to Mr. Wycoffs son , Bruce Wycoff, of the controlling voting stock 
of the corporations in stated increments as he reached the ages specified. The 
Will of Mr. Wycoff also provided that Zions, as Executor and as Trus tee , should 
engage Max W. Young as chief executive officer of the companies until Bruce 
Wycoff was able and willing to assume such role. In 1966, at the date of death 
of his father, Bruce Wycoff was attending college in the East , and in 1967 entered 
Harvard Business College to prepare himself to enter the bus ines s . Since pr ior 
to the trial and continuously to the p resen t , Bruce Wycoff has served as general 
manager and chief executive officer of all of the corporations. 
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For purposes of convenience in reference, further factual data is marshalled 
herein within categories pertinent to the legal arguments discussed in appellants' 
and respondents ' briefs: 
Testamentary Intention of M. S. Wycoff 
It was M . S . Wycoffs main purpose to build and keep the companies which 
he founded in order to provide a business opportunity for his son, Bruce Wycoff. 
(Tr . 297, Ab. 93) He wanted his son to become involved in the management 
of the companies if that was Bruce 's des i re . (Tr . 237, Ab. 70) As to ownership 
and control of the corporations, it was M . S . Wycoffs clear intention, expressed 
in his Will, that his son, Bruce Wycoff, be the fundamental beneficiary of all 
of his business interests , and that the trustee (Zions First National Bank) should 
" . . . gradually transfer to him control of any corporations or businesses which 
I may control at the time of my death; said gradual transfer or control may b e 
either by stock transfer or otherwise, and shall take place as rapidly as is prudent 
in the best business judgment and sole discretion of my Trus tee ." (Article VII -
Third - D . Exh ib i tP - l ; Cf. T r . 258, Ab. 78) 
In contradiction to the above expressed intention, plaintiff Max W. Young \ 
testified that the only way Bruce Wycoff could ever obtain control of the companies 
was to "prove himself to Max Young. (Tr . 182, Ab. 51) Young admitted that 
indeed M . S . Wycoff had control of all of the companies up to the date of his death 
(Tr . 184, Ab. 52) , but that an Agreement executed in 1965 relating to insurance 
proceeds (Exhibit P-3) which Young interpreted as relating only to redemption 
of voting stock (even though the document was silent as to the point) , also took 
effect upon Wycoffs death and superceded the Will. (Tr . 184, Ab . 52) As a 
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resul t , Max Young's conception of things was that Bruce Wycoffs position of 
control of any of the businesses depended entirely upon Max Young as the sole 
arbi t rator . (Tr. 1 8 3 , A b . 5 1 ) Inconsistently , for purposes of admission of 
Bruce Wycoff to Stanford University, at a time after M . S . Wycoff s death, Max 
Young revealed the t rue situation and overriding intent of M. S. Wycoff as to 
his son Bruce 's position in the bus iness . Max Young wrote as follows: 
Bruce Wycoff would make an outstanding graduate s tudent . 
He has a tremendous business opportunity ahead of him, 
in that he has available the administrative and financial 
control of a motor carr ier organization serving eight 
states in the Intermountain area which his father developed, 
and as the only he i r , Bruce will eventually receive. 
(Exhibit D-21) 
Position of Bruce Wycoff 
Bruce Wycoff worked from time to time in his fatherTs bus iness while he 
was growing u p . (Tr . 459, Ab. 150) At the time of termination of employment 
of Max Young, on or about February 1, 1968, Bruce Wycoff was attending graduate 
courses in the Harvard Business School, but this event caused him to come home, 
and he has assumed continuous responsibility and worked full time in the bus iness 
ever s ince. He testified: 
Q. Did you quit Harvard Business School? 
A. Not at that time. I took a leave of absence while I was 
finding out exactly what was happening. 
Q. Did you ever go back to Harvard Business School? 
A. Only to pick up my car and belongings. 
Q. Have you been working in the business ever since that 
time? 
A. Yes . 
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Q. Have you made an election to be with the business and 
to retain your ownership or prospective ownership rights 
in the business? 
A. Yes. (Tr. 461, Ab. 151) 
Bruce Wycoff further testified that he intends to remain active in the business : 
Q. Now , have you been attending the meetings of the Board 
of Directors since that time? 
A. Of our companies? 
Q. Companies, y e s . 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the stockholders 'meetings also? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it is your intention to continue on actively in the 
business that your father founded? 
A. You be t . 
Position of Max Young and Attitude After the Death of M. S. Wycoff 
In the period immediately following the death of M. S . Wycoff, Zions First 
National Bank, as Executor, had confidence in the existing management team, 
but such confidence was "lost quite rapidly ." (Tr . 243, Ab. 72) Mr. Young 
took the position from the outset that regardless of the needs of the estate, "There 
is no money and there wonft b e , " and that the matter "was not any concern of 
the company. That was [the Bank's] wor ry . " (Tr . 256, Ab. 78) Mr. Young 
testified that he had been helpful to Mr. Wycoff s widow by arranging to pay 
off her home mortgage: 
- 7 -
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. . . I knew that we had been positive in . . . t rying to 
support the estateTs position because we had gone down 
and paid off the mortgage on the home. . . . (Tr . 39, 
Ab. 8) 
However, Mrs . LaPearl Wycoff testified that in fact the mortgage was paid off 
by the proceeds of an insurance policy on Mr. Wycoff as to which she had been 
paying premiums for a number of y e a r s , which covered the mortgage. (Tr . 
452, Ab . 148) Arrangements for the payoff were made by the Bank as Executor, 
not by Mr. Young. (Tr . 453, Ab. 148) After some months, it became apparent 
to the Executor that Mr. Young was attempting "to take the bus iness from his 
former employer without investing any of his own money ," and that such evidenced 
a lack of "moral fibre" in Mr. Young. (Tr . 306, Ab . 95) 
Mr. Young claimed that by vir tue of a 1965 agreement which provided 
for redemption of stock (Exhibit P-3) , an obligation came into being to redeem 
only the Wycoff estate's voting sha re s , thereby resulting in the passage of control 
to Young. Zions First National Bank as Executor rejected this interpretation. 
The Executor offered to redeem on a 14 to 1 rat io, voting and non-voting stock 
(Tr . 289 Ab. 90); which was consistent with the pr ior ratio set up by Mr. Wycoff. 
(Exhibit P~28, p . 4) This was rejected by Young. As a resu l t , the $48,000.00 
proceeds of the insurance policy in question were sent back and forth several 
t imes, accompanied by claims of the respective positions taken. (Tr . 60-62, 
126, Ab . 15, 33) Accordingly , the proceeds in fact have never been applied 
in redemption of any stock, and have been banked and retained by Mountain 
Service , the beneficiary of the policy. (Such have not ever been banked or 
used by Zions First National Bank. ) 
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The ultimate interpretation by Max Young was that the stock redemption 
agreement gave to him the absolute election and right to call for whatever s tock, 
in whatever companies, he wanted to. (Tr . 187, Ab . 52) Young admitted that 
there was nothing in the agreement about voting stock, non-voting stock or t ransfer 
of control, and following an observation by the court that the agreement failed 
to indicate which of the two classes of stock were to be t ransferred, he testified 
that nonetheless he believed that he was given the right to call for the voting 
stock. (Tr . 187, Ab. 52) The net extravagant claim: that Young had a r ight 
to elect, and in fact did elect, to call for the voting stock in Wycoff Company. 
(Tr . 187, 196, 206, Ab. 52, 60) 
Position of Zions First National Bank as Executor 
All acts performed by Zions First National Bank in connection with any 
and all aspects of this case were done so in its capacity of Executor and/or T rus t ee , 
for the benefit of the Wycoff Companies. Accordingly, this Court entered a p r io r 
Order in effect eliminating all claims against Zions First National Bank individually 
or as an institution. (R. 29) 
As Executor of the estate, Zions was faced with an almost immediate need 
for the generation of cash. Claron O. Spencer, formerly chief t rust officer at 
Zions, and after M. S. Wycoff s death a director of the various companies, testified 
that the matter was discussed with Max Young in the early stages of the estate 
proceeding. (Tr . 255, Ab. 77) Mr. Spencer testified that Young made no attempt 
to find out what the needs of the estate would b e , but rather s tressed "very often" 
the needs of the company for cash. (Tr. 256, Ab. 77, 78) Much of the p r e s s 
for funds by Max Young "was occasioned by a desire to expand," and it was 
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intimated to Mr. Young that such might have to be "temporarily postponed" to 
"take care of the widow and the needs of the estate ." (Tr . 256, Ab . 78) In this 
r ega rd , death taxes imposed upon the estate were very substantial . By June 
of 1967, the first of several installments of $6,371.49 was paid to the federal 
government, as was $14,462.98 not available for installment treatment. (Tr . 
299, Ab . 93, Cf. Exhibit D-43) This was par t of the total federal tax imposed 
in the amount of $78,177.75 (Tr . 300, Ab . 93) , bu t excluded a deficiency of 
$57,458.30 which was contested. (Tr . 301, Ab. 93 , Cf. Exhibit D-43) Utah 
Inheritance Taxes amounted to $65,008.78. (Tr . 302, Ab. 94, Exhibit 45) 
Several alternatives were considered by the Executor as to how funds 
might b e generated to meet the needs of the estate, take care of the widow , and 
at the same time interfere as little as possible with the affairs of the companies. 
(Tr . 246, Ab. 74) It was determined that having accepted the appointment under 
the Will it was not appropriate to sell the companies1 stock, bu t ra ther "to do 
our best to preserve the companies for the eventual transfer to the son as expressed 
in the Will." (Tr . 257, 258, Ab. 78, 79) It was considered that basically the 
interests of the estate and those of the companies were "paral le l ." (Tr . 256, ^ 
Ab . 78) However, there was stonewall opposition by Max Young and "no cooperation" 
with respect to suggested alternatives for proceeding to raise necessary funds* 
(Tr . 260, Ab. 79) 
Decision of Executor to Become Active in Management as 
Representative of Majority Shareholder 
A matter of immediate concern to Zions First National Bank as Executor 
of the Estate of M. S. Wycoff was that the companies b e managed proper ly . (T r . 
- i n -
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243, Ab . 72) M . S . Wycoff had developed a management team, headed by Max 
Young, which he hoped could carry on the businesses after his death. In d iscuss-
ing his assets and business interests with Claron Spencer, then Head of the Trust 
Department of Zions First National Bank, which was to be the Executor of his 
estate and Testamentary Trus tee , Mr. Wycoff had expressed the desire that the 
Bank as Executor work with existing management where possible: 
He was veiy much concerned at what would happen to his 
business when he died and discussed with me on a number 
of occasions, stating among other things that he had developed 
a management team there which would in his opinion be quite 
helpful and effective to the Bank as an Executor and expressed 
much the same wish that he does in the Will that we consider 
their employment. (Tr . 297, Ab. 93, Cf. Exhibit P - l ) 
In view of the foregoing, and also because it was the clear policy of the Bank 
to avoid involving itself in management of companies, for approximately 18 months 
following the death of Mr. Wycoff, Zions avoided playing an active part in manage-
ment. (Tr . 307, Ab. 95) It became apparent , however, that the interests of 
the majority shareholder were not being furthered by existing management. 
Accordingly, at a shareholders1 meeting on September 1, 1967, the Executor 
did exercise its rights and voted to expand the Board of Directors from 5 to 9. 
(Tr . 260, 310, Ab. 79, 96) A stenographer 's transcript was made of the meeting 
in which Bylaws were adopted to permit Board expansion, and the establishment 
of the nine man board occurred. (Exhibit D-12) Thereafter, an Executive Committee 
was created, consisting of three persons , i . e . , two nominees of the majority 
stockholder's interest and Max Young. (Tr. 262, Ab. 80) One of the purposes 
of the Executive Committee was to restrict management as to spending. (Tr. 
262, Ab . 80) Another purpose was to require approval by the majority interests 
- 1 1 -
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as to new contracts and major decisions. (Tr . 262, Ab. 80) 
The need for "reliable information" and the absolute necessity "to find 
out what was going on" was deeply felt. (Tr . 266, Ab . 81) 
Suspicions as to Max Young - Discharge of Duties "With Fidelity"? 
M . S . Wycoff s recommendation to his Executor, Zions First National Bank, 
that Max Young b e continued on in management was not without qualification. 
The restriction which Mr. Wycoff recognized was that continuation of management 
must b e equated with absolute honesty and fidelity . Hence, M . S . Wycoff s will 
provided that Max Young b e named as the Chief Executive of his bus iness only 
"so long as he discharges his office or offices with fidelity . . . " (Article VIII -
Exhibit P - l ) 
In February 1967, Claron O. Spencer had a confrontation with Max Young 
as to what Spencer believed was an unconscionable and improper attempt by 
Young to take over control of the Companies, revealing a lack of "moral fibre." 
(Tr . 306, Ab. 95) By the summer it became apparent that Young would not cooper-
ate in connection with any alternative which would permit the release of funds 
to the majority stockholder, and that active policy involvement by Zions on the ^ 
Board of Directors was necessary . (Tr . 260, 308, Ab . 79) The need for employment 
of a t rusted comptroller became evident in the fall of 1967. (Tr . 264, 266, Ab. 
80, 81) Representatives of the Executor had reason to believe that information 
being received from the Max Young management was neither "factual nor complete 
at a l l . " (Tr . 312, Ab. 97) Independent auditors were contracted to check records 
as to cash flow projection and availability of funds, bu t Max Young announced 
that he wouldn't allow them on the premises without a court o rde r . (Tr . 312, 
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At a meeting of the Board of Directors on November 29, 1967 (Exhibit 
D-48) , there was direct discussion of a situation involving use of Wycoff Company 
funds in connection with the acquisition of properties and construction of a bui lding 
by Freeport Enterpr ises , a company controlled by Max Young. At that meeting, 
Mr. Spencer brought to the attention of the Board that title to property occupied 
by Freeport had been transferred from Wycoff Warehouse on October 23, 1967, 
and that a mortgage for $200,000.00 was recorded the same date as the deed. 
(Tr . 313, Ab . 98) Prior to this meeting, Mr. Young had talked to Mr. Spencer 
about the newly constructed building and its purposes: 
. . . we had been led to believe by statements from Mr. 
Young that this was a joint enterprise of Wycoff Corpora-
tion, Wycoff Company or Mountain Service . . . and then 
we discovered to our surpr i se that that was not the case. 
(Tr . 314, Ab. 98) 
Mr. Spencer further testified in response to questions from Mr. Roe: 
Q. You said you received information from the management 
that wasn't factual. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What information was that? 
A. Well, the first thing I recall is a letter which Max wrote 
in which he said that Freeport was a joint enterprise of 
Mountain Service as I recall it and Wycoff Corporation, and 
it never was such . It wasn' t until we began to dig into 
things that we found out that it was a wholly independent 
operation. (Tr . 329, Ab . 103) 
On December 19, 1967, a formal demand was made by the Executor to Mr. Young 
for reconveyance of the property in question. (Exhibit D-16) Mr. Young admitted 
that an appraisal of the building showed a substantially larger value, but that 
he and others had transferred it to Freeport at 15% above book value , less than 
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$40,000.00. (Tr. 153, Ab . 41) Fred Thurgood, Secre tary-Treasurer of Wycoff, 
testified that Young knew of an appraisal at $68,700.00 at the time that he arranged 
transfer of the building to Freeport for only $37,000 .00. (Tr . 517, Ab . 172) 
As a result of Zions demand, the property was conveyed back . (Tr. 152, Ab. 
40) 
Termination of Max Young - Hiring New Controller 
On January 30, 1968, a resolution defining duties was presented and adopted 
in connection with hi r ing a new Controller, William Shea. (Exhibit P - 5 , T r . 
264, 336, 337, Ab. 80, 106, 107) The Minutes of the meeting reflect the context 
in which the action was taken. (Exhibit D-13) Employment of Mr. Shea was 
resisted by Max Young, because he felt that the employment took control away 
from him. (Tr . 49, Ab. 10) 
On January 31 , 1968, Max Young presented a letter dated February 1, 
1968, to Claron O. Spencer. (Exhibit P - 2 , T r . 272, A b . 84) Young told Spencer 
that he was resigning as both Manager and Director. (Tr . 273, Ab. 84) Bruce 
Wycoff, summoned home from Boston, Massachusetts where at Harvard he was 
in the graduate bus iness school, testified that he approached Max Young several * 
days later to encourage him to reconsider and come back . Max Young's response 
was a firm, "No." (Tr . 462, Ab. 152) Max Young told Bruce that "he wanted 
to qui t . He had qui t . " (Tr . 492, Ab. 162) William Shea observed Max Young 
collecting his personal effects and leaving the office on February 1, 1968, after 
which he left the office and never re turned . (Tr . 384, Ab . 127) Shea further 
testified that Young wasn' t working for the Wycoff Companies after January 31 , 
1968, that he didn't represent himself as an employee of Wycoff thereafter, that 
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reports reflected termination on that date, and that Young was not paid from that 
date on. (Tr . 385, Ab. 128) 
On February 13, 1968, the Board of Directors accepted the February 1, 
1968, letter of Max Young as a letter of resignation, and regarded it as such , 
notwithstanding the then protestations by Young that he had not intended to r e s ign . 
(Tr . 274, Ab. 84) Mr. Spencer testified that even though there were "adequate 
grounds for discharging" Young, the Directors had been "long suffering." 
(Tr , 274, Ab. 84) He further testified that the evident failure by Max Young 
to serve "with fidelity" was a prime consideration in the Board's accepting the 
letter as termination of Young's se rv ices . (Tr . 275, Ab. 84) 
Financial Actions By Companies for Generation of Income 
- Creation of New Class of Stock and Redemption Thereof 
A legal opinion was sought by the new Board of Directors and obtained 
by tax counsel at Fabian and Clendenin in the summer of 1968. (Tr . 317, Ab. 
99) As a result of the opinion, which approved the contemplated procedure , 
a declaration of stock dividend was promulgated November 6, 1968 (Exhibit 50-
D) and a call for redemption of preferred shares occurred November 21 , 1968 
(Exhibit 51-P) Max Young received the notices relating to this matter (Tr . 54, 
Ab . 13) and participated in the stock redemption. He received the stock in question 
in the fall of 1968, and $45,000.00 in redemption thereof. (Tr . 176, Ab . 49) 
Young received the same tax treatment as to the receipt of the $45,000.00 he 
elected to receive as if it were a cash dividend. (Tr . 176, Ab . 49) Although 
he claimed "very severe" treatment by the IRS , the money received was simply 
treated as ordinary income, and he paid about one-third in taxes . (Tr . 55, 
Ab. 13) 
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The entire stock redemption was for $180,000.00, and the estate 
as majority stockholder received approximately $100,000.00 thereof, under a 
provision of law which permitted favorable tax treatment. (Tr . 248, 250 , Ab . 
75, 76) The distribution for the estate permitted it to pay federal taxes and other 
claims th€>n due . (Tr . 249, Ab. 75) The $180,000.00 (part of a larger loan) 
was borrowed from Zions First National Bank at 7% interest . (Tr . 343, Ab. 110) 
This rate was very favorable and competitive with any other available money 
or institution. (Tr . 496, Ab. 164) 
~ Dividend Payment 
A dividend of $105,000.00 was declared and paid to shareholders 
in 1973. (Tr . 360, Ab. 115) This was the first payment of a dividend since 
the stockholders dividend in 1968. (Exhibit D-71) No dividends were declared 
or paid while Max Young was manager. (March 1, 1966 to February 1, 1968) 
All shareholders of record , including Max Young, shared proportionately in 
receipt of the declared cash dividend. 
- Debenture Retirement . 
Mr. Shea had noted pr ior action by the Wycoff Board of Directors , x 
participated in and actively advocated by Max Young, in the discussion of and 
affirmative action approving intended early redemption of debentures which r ep re -
sented funds loaned to the Companies by M. S. Wycoff. (Tr . 379, 388, 389, 
Ab . 125, 128, 129, Exhibits 72-D and 73-D) Such debenture retirement hence 
became a matter of consideration in terms of previously approved and recognized 
Board discussions, for the generation of needed income to the majority shareholder 's 
estate . 
-16-
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As part of the "desperate endeavor to acquire funds to pay taxes 
and the widow's allowance," Wycoff management utilized $50,000.00 borrowed 
from Zions First National Bank for an equal term at 7% to ret i re $50,000.00 in 
outstanding 7% debentures due in 1978. (Tr. 255, 277, Ab. 77, 85) Given the 
need and desirability to generate funds for the majority shareholder , on an equitable 
bas i s , this was of "substantial financial advantage to the Companies," as opposed 
to dividend declaration, because it "allowed the companies to retain more working 
capital." (Tr . 378, Ab. 124) As to this $50,000.00 redemption, the net effect 
to the balance sheet was the same whether the debentures were paid off early 
or at maturi ty, since the borrowed money was at the same interest r a t e , and 
with a slightly more liberal due date than the debentures . (Tr . 346, 380, Ab. 
I l l , 126) 
Additional debentures totalling $60,000.00 were likewise redeemed, 
but as to that redemption there was no need for additional borrowings , since 
redemption was made from available funds. (Tr . 346, Ab. I l l ) 
All debenture holders were treated equally in the proferred redemp-
tions, although certain holders (Bruce Wycoff and Leland Clayton) elected not % 
to redeem. (Tr . 390, Ab. 129) Since Max Young had not loaned any money to 
the Companies, he had no debentures to redeem. (Tr. 390, A b . 129) 
Mountain Service had a continuing revolving line of credit with 
Zions First National Bank dating back to 1960, arranged for by M. S. Wycoff, 
for working capital. As a par t of the continuing working capital needs , and 
in furtherance of pre-exist ing arrangements, Mountain Service borrowed 
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$300,000.00 in November 1968. (Exhibit D-82) Thereafter, further extensions 
were made under this credit l ine, and payments in reduction thereof have been 
made. Over the years the balance has fluctuated depending upon amounts of 
funds extended and repayments made as dictated by capital needs from time to 
time. The credit arrangement has been and is that afforded preferred customers 
of Zions First National Bank, namely a tie in of interest rates to a percentage 
over the prevail ing prime rate as such might fluctuate from time to time. This 
loan was and is collateralized by Wycoff t r ucks . It is unrelated and irrelevant 
to the matter of debenture retirement. 
Operation of the Companies by New Board of Directors 
The policy of the new Board, which assumed active participation in manage-
ment commencing September 1, 1967, was to "build asse ts , keep expenses low, 
keep income high and retain as much money for the bus iness as possible ." (Tr . 
341, Ab . 109) There was s t ress upon the need to meet crucial financial needs 
of the majority shareholder , bu t there was no pointed emphasis for non-'growth. 
(Tr . 341, 342, Ab . 109) 
The fundamental "acts of oppression" which plaintiffs appear to complain 
about are detailed above. In addition thereto, certain other alleged "oppressive 
acts" are claimed, and the following miscellaneous activities and policies concerning 
operation of the companies are responsive to what plaintiff testified were such 
alleged other "oppressive acts" by and on the par t of Zions First National Bank 
and the Wycoff Companies: 
-18 -
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" Rates of Growth 
The fundamental exhibit presented in connection with operation 
of the Wycoff Companies from and after the time Max Young left on February 1, 
1968, was a three page summary exhibit showing growth. (Exhibit 71-D) This 
factual summary shows a r ise in total equity from about $1.5 million in 1967 to 
about $2.25 million in 1973. The book value increase over that period of time 
amounted to $703,055.00, or 45.6% growth over that period of time. It should 
be noted, however, that in addition, $304,439.00 was actually paid in dividends 
over the same per iod, so the real growth was $1,007,494.00, being 65.4% or 
about 11% pe r annum. These growth patterns were shown as to each of the four 
companies in question. (Exhibit 7HD, pages 2 and 3; Cf. all year end audit 
reports - Exhibits 54-57; T r . 354, Ab. 113) 
Counsel for appellants recognize that the rate of growth between 
the years 1967 and 1973 was 11% per yea r , but claim that since the growth rate 
was higher in the short period after the death of M. S. Wycoff it should b e concluded 
that ZionsT sole purpose was to slow down the growth ra t e . (App. Brief, p . 
16) However, there is reason to question as illusory the allegedly dramatically 
higher growth rates for the previous period. Using the lower comparative bases 
in the strictly % comparisons, plaintiffs1 accountant at first blush seemed to show 
an adverse comparison between the "Max Young years" of 1965 to 1967 as compared 
with the "post Max Young years" of 1967 to 1973. (Exhibit 29-P , T r . 220, 235, 
236, Ab. 65, 69, 70) But such percentage comparisons are not fair because of 
substantial differences in the bases of comparison (use of the lower beginning 
base of just over $1 million in 1965 for the "Max Young yea r s" as compared with 
the higher start ing base of over $1.5 million in 1967 for the "post Max Young D gitized by th Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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years" ) , and the need for adjustments due to distortions. In this r ega rd , Mr. 
Shea pointed out the existence of some distortions in connection with the percentage 
rate comparisons identified by Mr. Jackson, Max Young's accountant. (Tr . 
400, 407, 408, Ab . 134, 137) According to Mr. Shea, these distortions would 
require adjustments amounting to $116,000.00 as to asset va lues , necessitating 
income adjustments in excess of $50,000.00. (Tr . 410, 411, Ab . 138, 139) The 
net effect of such adjustments would b e to place into later yea r s income attributed 
to the "Max Young years" of 1966 and 1967. This is contrary to the claim of 
appellants that adjustments should have been made which "caused an unrealist ic 
inflation of income dur ing the yea r s of Zions control ." (App. Brief, p . 15) 
Mr. Shea pointed out a threefold explanation for the dip in income shown for 
1968 in the Wycoff books , i . e . , reduction of business by loss of the Libby McNiel 
contract, illusory asse t s , including many non-existent pal le ts , which had to 
b e written off to the tune of over $17,000.00, and a considerable wage and salary 
increase . (Tr . 382, 383, Ab. 126) Accordingly, Mr. Shea testified that the 
use of 1968 as a par t of the averaging for "post Max Young" years tends to mislead 
since it reflects problems which really were inherited from the pr ior per iod. x 
All exhibits submitted by both sides agree on one thing: the actual 
dollar r i se and increase of real assets over the entire period of t ime. Translated 
into the average dollar amount pe r annum, the increase dur ing the "Max Young 
yea r s " is really similar to the increase dur ing the "post Max Young y e a r s . " 
The admitted dollar increase over the "post Max Young yea r s " (the six yea r 
period 1968-73) would amount to an annual average income of $167,915.00. 
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The average dollar increase per annum for the "Max Young years" (the two year 
period 1966 and 1967) would be $184,542.00. 
- Banking Connections 
At meetings of the "new" Board of Directors, management was admon-
ished to attempt to make contacts with banks other than Zions First National Bank 
in the area in order to seek out, if possible , more competitive interest r a tes , 
and things of that na ture . (Tr. 391, Ab. 130) This resulted in substantial efforts 
by William Shea to obtain financing at other banks . In this r egard , Mr. Shea 
testified with respect to contacts at First Security Bank, Tracy-Collins, Commercial 
Securi ty, Continental Bank, Walker Bank & Trus t , Idaho First National, Beehive 
State Bank and others . (Tr . 391, 392, Ab. 130) Mr. Shea found interest rates 
to b e comparable to , but certainly no better than, Zions First National Bank. 
At Walker he found that the rates were the same. (Tr. 393, Ab. 131) Regardless 
of interest r a tes , however, it was discovered that loans at these institutions 
were not available to the Wycoff companies. The limiting factor discovered was 
a reluctance by any bank to extend large sums when the Wycoff properties were 
already encumbered at another institution. Mr. Shea testified: ^ 
Q. As you have indicated, the source of the funds to 
borrow is dependent sometimes on where you maintain 
the checking accounts? 
A. Well, I think it is even deeper than that. I think 
where you borrow funds is dependent somewhat on where 
you have your property mortgaged. 
Q. And the mortgages of the Wycoff Companies that they 
have are held by Zions First National Bank, too? 
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A. A good many of them. They were—-most of them 
were when I came into the company and still a r e . I 
couldnft get loans from other banks because of the mort-
gages that existed on the property in the name of Zions 
and Walker Bank. (Tr . 350, Ab. 112; Cf. T r . 415, Ab. 140) 
Mr. Shea pointed out that substantial borrowings in fact were obtained where 
possible from institutions other than Zions. (Tr . 350, Ab. 112) John Langeland, 
Senior Vice President of Zions First National Bank in charge of commercial loans , 
testified that he had assisted Wycoff management to obtain a large loan in Idaho 
at favorable ra tes . (Tr . 498, Ab. 164) Mr. Shea testified that the percentage 
of loans with Zions when he was employed was about 56%, and that it rose only 
to 62% dur ing the "post Max Young" per iod. (Tr . 394, 414, Ab. 131, 140) The 
banking connections of Wycoff with Zions were pointed out as being not only 
competitive with other insti tutions, bu t particularly favorable and even border ing 
upon preferential . (Tr . 496-498, Ab . 164) 
- Supplying Information and Notices to Max Young 
The record of minutes indicates that Max Young attended Board 
meetings over the period of time in question. He was provided all notices given 
to any other director . A request by Max Young for analysis of salary s tructure 
resulted in supplying such information to Mr. Young. (Tr . 386, Ab. 128, Exhibit 
34-D) Mr. Young in fact was never denied access to any books and records 
at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice. Mr. Young's accountant, Mr. 
Jackson, was granted full access to all books and records , in order to make an 
accounting analysis . 
- Expansion - Operating Authorities 
During the period following termination of Max Young, there was 
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a substantial extension within the operating area with reference to ICC operational 
authority. (Tr. 399, Ab . 133) Bruce Wycoff testified at length by way of com-
parison of the attempted expansion while Max Young was Chief Executive Officer 
with expansion thereafter. He pointed out that some 24 applications for permits 
before the ICC were submitted since 1968, plus additional expansion activity 
in surrounding s ta tes , including Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado and Arizona. (Tr . 
472, Ab. 156; T r . 489, Ab. 161) While Max Young was in charge, over a period 
of 698 days , only seven (7) "subs" were filed; since then, over a period of 2,466 
days , 24 "subs" were filed, which Mr. Bruce Wycoff testified constituted a much 
bet ter rate of expansion activity. (Tr . 475, Ab. 157) 
- Rate Increases 
When Max Young left, there was a low rate level and this resulted 
in a substantial lag and delay before the management team was able to go forward 
with procedural requirements to accomplish an increase to realistic levels . 
(Tr . 413, Ab . 140) 
- Minutes: Inaccuracies? 
Max Young was critical of the minutes of Board of Directors meetings, 
kept by Robert Barnes , a t rus t officer at Zions and secretary of the corporation. 
(Tr . 143, 144, Ab. 37) However, Young could point to no specific e r r o r s , and 
could not relate a single instance where there was failure accurately to report 
passage of resolutions or other action by the Board, and Young had no notes 
of his own or records to show inaccuracies. (Tr . 143, Ab. 37) On the other 
hand , Robert Barnes testified that in fact all of the minutes he took were accurate 
and faithful recitations of the substance of what was said and done, although 
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not purport ing to be verbatim. (Tr . 505-507, Ab . 167) All of the minutes in 
question were presented to the court and admitted as evidence. 
- Accounting Practices 
At page 14 of Appellants' Brief there is reference to the claim of 
Max Young that changes in accounting methods resulted in questionable allocations 
of income, speaking of insurance rebates , sale of a warehouse and depreciation 
methods. However, the Internal Revenue Service audited the companies, and 
changes which were made as to depreciation were required by IRS (Tr . 358, 
Ab . 114) Accordingly, any changes in methods of depreciation of equipment 
o r other depreciable assets since 1968 were made solely for the purpose of conform-
ing to the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service . As to the other alleged 
changes, the evidence was that adjustments such as liability insurance rebates , 
and U . S . Post Office contracts since 1968 were handled exactly the same as they 
were pr ior to that time - on a "cash" b a s i s , and any change in accounting methods 
as to such items would b e inconsistent with the requirements of the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
Oppressive Acts by Max Young 
The evidence adduced at trial made it abundantly clear that appellant 
Max Young is in no position to allege and assert oppression on the par t of any 
of the defendants. In several respec ts , and through the auspices of several 
companies owned or controlled by himself, Max Young engaged in direct and 
indirect competition against Wycoff interests while an employee and/or director 
of the Wycoff Companies. While a director of Wycoff, Young "was doing everything 
he could to take bus iness" for himself as to air freight at a time when Wycoff 
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was actively engaged in solicitation and efforts to increase its air freight b u s i n e s s . 
(Tr . 464, 465, Ab. 152) Young actively solicited Wycoff customers engaged 
in the transportation of air freight on behalf of Pickering Transfer , his wholly 
owned company. (Tr. 72, Ab. 17) In another corporation, named ABC, Young 
assisted it in application for mail contracts in competition with Wycoff. (Tr . 
79, Ab. 19) While with Wycoff, Young surreptitiously outbid Wycoff for a mail 
route to Reno on behalf of his company, Eagle Moving. (Tr. 80, Ab. 19) Bruce 
Wycoff identified exhibits to document competitive acts by Young for Eagle Transfer 
in the field of air freight, during the period he was on the Board of Directors 
of Wycoff, although terminated as to management. (Tr . 464, 465, 467, Ab . 153, 
154) 
A major and aggravated situation which demonstrated that Mr. Young did 
not come to the court with "clean hands" on the issue of "oppression" or wrongful 
conduct, was his activities relative to Freeport Enterpr ises , a company controlled 
by him. The record reveals that in August 1967, when Young was representing 
to the majority shareholders that there were "no cash funds" available to assist 
the estate, he paid from Wycoff funds to the U .P . Railroad over $18,000.00 for . • ' 
a railroad spur for Freeport . (Exhibit 26-D; T r . 202, Ab. 58) Also, without 
any authority to do so , Young borrowed for the sole benefit of Freeport , $120,000.00 
from Walker Bank on the strength of Wycoff securi ty . (Tr . 199, 200 , Ab. 58) 
Another unconscionable fact situation relative to Eagle Moving Company 
came to light after Max Young left the management of Wycoff. Eagle Moving was 
owned 51%by Max Young and he operated i t . (Tr . 76, Ab. 18; T r . 162, Ab . 45) 
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Young admitted that Wycoff employees and trucks were used for the delivery 
service of Eagle Moving. (Tr . 9 1 , Ab. 23; T r . 97, Ab. 26) An outside audit 
of records of Eagle customers', that is customers billed by Eagle, bu t the service 
as to which was performed by Wycoff, showed a loss to Wycoff Company, Incorpor-
ated in#the amount of $33,800.00 for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967. (Tr . 409, 
Ab . 137, 138) 
When Young left on or about February 1, 1968, he helped himself to $5,000.00, 
declaring a bonus for himself without benefit of any authorization by the Board 
of Directors or the newly formed Executive Committee of the Board. (Tr . 83, 
84, Ab. 20) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW OF THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Appellant apparently is claiming an abuse of discretion by the tr ial cour t , 
and requests this court to "exercise an independent review of the evidence and 
make its judgment on the basis of the record . " (App. Brief, p . 24) Counsel 
then reviews various points and matters as though attempting to persuade a fact 
finder as to the preponderance of evidence. It must b e remembered, however , 
that the trial judge heard all of the evidence, observed the conduct of the wi tnesses , 
reviewed the exhibi ts , heard extensive arguments , and has entered Findings 
based upon the totality of the record . Those Findings represent the considered 
judgment of the tr ial court , and should not b e d is regarded . It is submitted that 
in every instance such are based upon substantial evidence presented at tr ial 
and should not be overturned by this Court. 
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Respondent agrees that it is well established that an appellate court may 
review the evidence in an equity case. Pagano v . Walker, Utah , 539 
P.2d 451 (Utah 1975) However, it is equally well established that the Supreme 
Court of Utah will not upset the finding of the trial court in an equity case without 
good reason: 
Even though our constitutional provision, Section 9 of 
Article VIII, states that in equity cases this court may 
review the facts, we nevertheless take into account the 
advantaged position of the trial judge . Accordingly, 
we recognize that it is his prerogative to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses , and in case of conflict, 
we assume that the trial court believed the evidence 
which supports the findings. We review the whole 
evidence in the light most favorable to them; and we 
will not disturb them merely because this court might 
have viewed the matter differently, but only if the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings. 
Stone v . Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 380, 431 P.2d 802, 
803(1967) [Emphasis added.] 
Accord: Corbet v . Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970) [Action for settle-
ment of partnership accounts] . See also Pagano v . Walker, supra . 
This principle has also been applied by other courts in cases similar to 
this one. In White v . Perk ins , 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972), a case in 
• • • • " • • — • " ' • • ' • ' - • ' • ' . \ ' 
which a minority shareholder sought dissolution of a corporation on the basis 
of allegedly "oppressive" conduct of the majority stockholder, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia stated: 
. . . a finding of fact by the chancellor hearing evidence 
ore tenus carries the weight of a jury verdict , and cannot 
b e disturbed by us unless plainly wrong or without evi-
dence to support i t . 
Id. at 319. SeeLiddell v . Smith, 65 111. App. 2d 352, 213N.E.2d 604 (1965). 
Thus , although it is clear that this Court may review the evidence in this 
case, it is equally clear that due deference must be given to the Findings and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Conclusions of the tr ial court. Obviously , a trial court may accept one partyTs 
version of the evidence over that offered by the other pa r ty . To do so is the 
role of the judge sitting without a jury in an equity case . Therefore, after according 
appropriate deference to the Findings of the trial judge and reviewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to those Findings , unless it can b e shown that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against those Findings, the tr ial court must 
be affirmed. Stone v . Stone, sup ra . This principle has been enunciated many 
times by this court , most recently in Eastman v . Eastman. (Case No. 14394 -
decided December 20, 1976.) 
POINT II. 
THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
"OPPRESSIVE" ACTS, OR OTHERWISE VIOLATE 
§ 16-10-92, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Section 16-10-92, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
The district court shall have full power to liquidate 
the assets and business of a corporation; 
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is 
established: 
* * * " ' • . , 
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in ** 
control of the corporation are il legal, oppressive or 
fraudulent; . . . 
No claim is made here of acts of illegality or fraud. The entire case is 
based upon alleged acts of oppression. 
We have found no Utah case interpret ing the meaning of "oppress ive ," 
either in the context of the involuntary dissolution statute or otherwise. The 
ordinary meaning, however, is set forth in Corpus Jur i s Secundum as: 
- 9 Q -
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Harsh, rigorous or severe . Tested by ordinary definition 
and by common understanding, the word "oppressive," 
as applied to conduct, means conduct that is unjustly 
burdensome, harsh or merciless. 6 7 C . J . S . 509, 510. 
In Eureka Building & Loan Association v . Meyers, 147 Kan 609, 78 P.2d 68, 
the court equated "oppressive" with "harsh , vigorous or severe . " (Held, action 
by County Board of Equality in failing to grant application of Building & Loan 
Co. for correction of alleged e r ror as to value of realty did not constitute oppres -
sive act . ) Similarly, in Domus Realty Corp. v . 3440 Realty Co . , 40 NYS 2d 69, 
73, the court defined "oppressive" as "unjustly burdensome, harsh or merc i less ." 
(In discussing oppressive conduct on part of mortgagee as bear ing upon courtTs 
equitable power to deny remedy.) 
The quoted statute was taken verbatim from the Model Business Corporation 
Act. That Act, drafted by the Committee of Corporate Laws of the Section of 
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, has 
become the foundation of the corporate laws of most s tates , including Utah. 
The same committee which originally drafted the Model Business Corporation 
Act, provided the following commentary relative to the section allowing involuntary 
dissolution in an action by a shareholder: 
The Model Act provides rules to cover involuntary d is -
solutions by shareholders by defining four factual situa-
tions in which the courts have the power to liquidate the 
assets and business of the corporation. . . . Second, 
the controlling directors or managers acting in an 
illegal, oppressive or fraudulent manner. While the 
terms "il legal," "oppressive" or "fraudulent" are sub-
ject to judicial interpretation, they have somewhat 
limited definitions within all jurisdict ions. [Emphasis 
added.] Model Bus . Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 97 TT 2 at 
554. 
- 2 9 -
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Although Utah has no cases construing this provision, other jurisdictions 
have decided cases which generally indicate limits on the scope of activity which * 
will be held to be "oppressive" under the Act. See Central Standard Life 
Insurance Company v . Davis, 10 111. 2d 566, 141N.E.2d45 (1957), Gidwitz 
v . Lanzit Corrugated Box C o . , 20 111. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960); White 
v . Perk ins , supra . It must be kept in mind that a closely held corporation 
is not like a pa r tne r sh ip , i . e . , a minority stockholder of a close corporation 
does not have the r ight to demand dissolution of a corporation upon substantially 
the same showing as might b e sufficient for dissolution of a pa r tne r sh ip . 
B a k e r v , Commercial Body Bui lders , I n c . , Ore . 507 P . 2d 387 (1973). 
Additionally, and particularly relevant to the argument of Appellants, is the 
simple fact that: 
. . • the management is controlled by the stockholders 
acting through their elected di rectors , and it is con-
templated that the corporation is to be controlled by 
the majority stockholders. Gidwitz v . Lanzit 
Corrugated Box C o . , supra at 135. 
In the instant case , Max Young was never denied the right or opportunity 
to participate in management decisions to the extent of his stock ownership (25%) / 
His claim seems to arise from the fact that he disagreed with the way in which the 
majority stockholders desired the company to be r u n . However, given the limited 
extent of his stock ownership, Mr. Young could not expect that the company would 
b e run according to his wishes . T h u s , the real question seems to b e whether the 
majority stockholders breached any duty owed to the minority s tockholders , and 
if they did , whether dissolution is an appropriate remedy for the b r each . 
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To say that majority stockholders owe a duty to minority stockholders is 
only a start ing point. The nature and scope of the duty owed must be examined. 
The assertion that majority stockholders are fiduciaries (Appellants1 Brief at 
26) is open to question: 
Controlling shareholders are not regarded as fiduciaries, 
in the classic sense , at common law or under the statutes; 
but general concepts of fiduciary law are frequently used 
in characterizing conduct by the majority that entitles 
the minority to relief. Comment, Oppression as a 
Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, Duke L . J . 
128, 133, 133 (1965). 
Thus , the question still remains as to what duties respondents owed appellants 
and whether any of those duties were breached. 
Appellants argue that numerous continuing acts by the majority may amount 
to "oppressive" conduct, even though the acts taken individually would not neces-
sarily b e "oppress ive." It appears to be admitted that no single grievance or 
alleged act of oppression adduced at trial would under any definition constitute 
"oppressive" conduct on the par t of Zions First National Bank or those in control 
of the Wycoff boa rds . Rather, the argument seems to be that cumulatively the 
various circumstances add up to "oppressive." That is to say , that acts which 
in and of themselves are not oppressive, when taken together additively, amount 
to oppression. This is something like the new mathematics in which it is p r o -
claimed that two plus two equals five. In any event, the authority cited for 
the "cumulative effect" proposition, Gidwitz v . Lanzit Corrugated Box C o . , 
s u p r a , involved much different circumstances than are present in this case. 
In Gidwitz the allegedly "oppressive" behavior had continued for a period of 
10 y e a r s , and the oppressing party was not a majority stockholder, stock 
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ownership being split 50-50 between two families. The oppressing party had 
used his office as president of the corporation to gain his advantage and had 
denied plaintiffs the opportunity to participate in corporate affairs, including 
the election of d i rectors . The facts of this case are not even remotely similar 
to those in Gidwitz. In the case at b a r , Mr. Young was never denied his r ight 
to participate in meetings or vote for d i rec tors . By way of contrast with Gidwitz, 
the major act of alleged oppression in this case is the alleged fact that the majority 
decided to make a temporary change in corporate policy to accommodate the needs 
of the estate of the founder and principal stockholder. 
As to other acts of the majority, Appellants cite several as either being 
oppressive or tending to be oppressive in cumulative effect. Appellant seems 
to place special weight on the allegation that respondents1 course of conduct 
deprived the corporation of some profits which could have been made. However, 
the fact that a corporation did not make as great a profit as was possible is not 
evidence of oppression: 
. . . courts of equity will not undertake to control the 
policy or business methods of a corporation, although 
it may seem that a wiser policy might be adopted, and 
the bus iness more successful if other methods were 
pursued . [Emphasis added. ] Polikoff v . Dale and 
Clark Building Corporation, 37 111. App. 2d 29, 184 
N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962), citing Wheeler v . Pullman 
Iron and Steel C o . , 143 111. 197, 32N.E . 420. 
Accord, Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v . Davis , s u p r a . It must b e 
remembered that the corporations in question continued to make a substantial 
profit dur ing the period of the dispute, with an admitted healthy rate of growth 
at 11% pe r annum and an average annual income of over $167,000.00. 
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With regard to certain allegedly oppressive acts , the Appellants take incon-
sistent positions. They assert that part of the primary obligation of Respondents 
as controlling shareholders was to "distribute those profits ." (Appellants1 Brief, 
p . 36) However, it is later argued that distributions which were made were 
oppressive because they caused an unfortunate tax consequence for Appellants. 
The test and context within which any claim of oppression must be evaluated 
is set forth in Polikoff v . Dale and Clark Building Corporation: 
It i s , however, fundamental in the law of corporations 
that the majority of its stockholders shall control the 
policy of the corporation, and regulate and govern the 
lawful exercise of its franchise and business * * * 
Everyone purchasing or subscribing for stock in a 
corporation impliedly agrees that he will be bound by 
the acts and proceedings done or sanctioned by a majority 
of the shareholders , or by the agents of the corporation 
duly chosen by such majority, within the scope of the 
powers conferred by the charter . And courts of equity 
will not undertake to control the policy or business 
methods of a corporation, although it may be seen that 
a wiser policy might be adopted, and the business more 
successful if other methods were pursued . The majority 
of shares of its stock, or the agents by the holders 
thereof lawfully chosen, must be permitted to control the 
business of the corporation in their discretion, when not 
in violation of its char ter , or some public law, or com-
pletely and fraudulently subversive of the rights and 
interests of the corporation or of a shareholder. Id. at 
795. * 
Every minority stockholder must respect this framework which is the basis of 
any corporation. 
Appellant Max Young and counsel for plaintiffs seem to question the p r o -
priety of Zions First National Bank in assuming an active part in the management 
of the companies, as somehow amounting to "oppressive" action. In this r ega rd , 
it is manifest that M . S . Wycoff contemplated that control of the corporation in 
-33-
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question should be reposed in Zions First National Bank as Trus tee , if the said 
Trustee should elect to operate the bus inesses . The "Residuary T r u s t , " which 
contained all of the decedentTs shares of voting stock in the corporations in question 
and therefore majority control, provides that in the discretion of the Trustee 
such corporations may be "operated and preserved by my said Trustee until 
said corporations or businesses can be properly managed and controlled by my 
said son." (Article VII - Third - D) Furthermore, the Testator-Settlor made 
it plain that the Trus tee , in its discretion, might "elect to operate and p rese rve 
any corporations or businesses which I may control at the time of my death . . . " 
(Article VIII) Even the direction that the Trustee should name Max W. Young 
as an executive of such corporations or businesses contemplates as a pre-condition 
thereof the assumption of control by the Trus tee . Accordingly, it is submitted 
that the basic intent of the Testator-Settlor in substance was to repose control 
of the corporations in the Trus tee , else how could the Trustee be charged with 
the duty to "operate" and "preserve" the corporations in question? 
Assumption of an active role on the Board of Directors by Zions was a 
natural and very usual thing to occur. As is stated in Volume 2, Scott on Trusts /* 
Section 170 at page 904: 
It not infrequently happens that a t rustee holding 
shares of a corporation as a par t of the t rust estate 
is or becomes an officer or director of the corporation. 
* * * 
Where the trustee holds all the shares of a corporation 
or a sufficient number of shares to give him substan-
tial power of control over the election of directors and 
ultimately over the administration of the affairs of the 
corporation, he has wide discretion in the exercise of 
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his powers; and in accordance with the general principle 
applicable to the exercise of discretionary powers , the 
Court will not interfere with the exercise of the power 
unless he is guilty of an abuse of discretion. [Citations, 
Section 193.2 at page 1049] 
When Zions finally voted the majority stock to elect directors who would reflect 
the majority interest (after about 18 months of operations by Max Young after 
M . S . Wycoffs death and absolute control by the minority interests to the detr i -
ment of majority interests) , the purpose was to "build assets , keep expenses low , 
keep income high and retain as much income for the business as possible ." (Tr . 
341, 342, Ab . 109) It was of part icular concern to the bank as holder of the 
majority stock that the corporations be managed proper ly . (Tr . 243, Ab. 72) 
Since the businesses had been built up over the years and represented the life 
blood and reinvested capital of M. S. Wycoff, the needs of his widow and the 
payment of debts and taxes necessary to preserve the companies intact for his 
son and he i r , Bruce Wycoff, were of course taken into consideration. Testimony 
at trial was clear that the basic interests of the estate and the companies were 
paral lel . (Tr. 256, Ab. 78) There was no abandonment of the interests of the 
companies in connection with the operation thereof after Zions assumed active 
involvement on the Board of Directors . To the contrary, there was a carefully 
programmed operation for reasonable profit and growth, not mere preservation 
of the companies. It certainly was a par t of the bank ' s purpose to honor the 
desire and will of M. S. Wycoff to preserve profitable companies for eventual 
passage of ownership to Bruce Wycoff. (Tr . 258, Ab. 79) Is that oppression? 
Max Young would seem to be arguing that the objective of management should 
have been to preserve the corporations for him. Young obtained benefits during 
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came to him by way of gift from M . S . Wycoff. M . S . Wycoff, on the other hand , 
built up the business and reinvested and kept his money and capital in the 
bus inesses . The debentures which were redeemed were h is loans to the com-
panies . No such loans were ever made by Max Young. Was it the intent of M. S. 
Wycoff to reinvest everything so as to p reserve the benefits of ownership for 
Max Young? Certainly not. Of course , it was an objective to p reserve the b u s i -
nesses for the son and he i r , Bruce Wycoff. 
In the instant case , Respondents have done nothing inappropriate or oppres-
s ive , but have merely exercised their discretion in a manner inconsistent with 
and contrary to the selfish desires and plans of Appellant Young. 
POINT III. 
IN ANY EVENT LIQUIDATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE 
WYCOFF COMPANIES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE 
APPROPRIATE REMEDIES 
Appellants argue that the alleged "oppressive" actions of the Respondents 
warrant dissolution of the corporations involved. After full review of all of the 
evidence, the tr ial court found that Respondents were not guilty of any "oppressive" 
conduct within the meaning of Section 16-10-92. This conclusion and finding is * 
entitled to substantial weight. Stone v . Stone, sup ra . White v . Perk ins , sup ra . 
The conclusion of the trial court in rejecting dissolution evidences the 
appropriate caution exercised by courts hear ing arguments in favor of the dissolu-
tion of corporations. The Illinois Court has cautioned: 
The Business Corporation Act has given to the courts the 
power to relieve minority shareholders from oppressive 
acts of the majority, but the remedy of liquidation is so 
drastic that it must b e invoked with extreme caution. The 
ends of justice would not be served by too broad an appli-
cation of the statute, for that would merely eliminate one 
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evil by substituting a greater one - Oppression of the 
majority by the minority. Polikoff v . Dale and Clark 
Building Corporation, supra , id. at p . 795. 
Even if certain acts were "oppressive" within the meaning of the Act, arguendo, 
since there is no evidence that such acts would continue, dissolution would be 
inappropriate within the holding of Baker v . Commercial Body Bui lders , Inc. , 
supra . Manifestly, remedies alternative to dissolution would be within the power 
and discretion of the court. In this regard , it would certainly b e the furthest 
thing from the expressed desire of the decedent Milton Stanley Wycoff for the 
companies which he founded and built up as a family business to now be liquidated 
and dissolved. 
In substance and effect, the claimed acts of oppression by Respondents 
consisted of the exercise of their best business judgment under the circumstances. 
In spite of the fact that Appellants disagree with the exercise of that judgment, 
Respondents' conduct does not amount to oppression warranting dissolution. 
POINT IV. 
LAST WILL OF M. S. WYCOFF DID NOT GIVE MAX YOUNG 
AN ENFORCEABLE AND CONTINUOUS RIGHT TO BE CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE COMPANIES 
Article VIII of the Last Will and Testament of Milton Stanley Wycoff, deceased, 
under which the defendant Zions is acting as executor and trustee provides in par t 
as follows: 
In the event my trustee should elect to operate and 
preserve any corporations or businesses which I may 
control at the time of my death as permitted under the 
terms of any t rus t created hereby, then and in that event 
I direct my trustee to continue the operation of such cor-
porations or businesses by continuing as executive offi-
cers and directors those persons who occupy similar 
positions in said corporations or businesses at the time 
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of my death, including directors and other corporate 
officers. However, I direct my trustee to name Max 
W. Young, if he is then living and is then serving 
as an executive of any such corporations or bus ines se s , 
as the chief executive of said corporations or bus inesses , 
so long as. he discharges his office or offices with 
fidelity and so long as said corporations or businesses 
are operated at a profit. . . [Emphasis added. ] (Exh. 
P - D 
Appellants in their brief argue in essence that the terms of the Will supersede 
the r ights and duties of the corporate directors in the management of the bus iness 
affairs of the companies. In essence, Max Young asser ts that the dead hand of 
Mr. Wycoff was still at the helm of the corporations, guiding their affairs and 
dictating to the four Boards of Directors the identity of who should b e employed 
in management. 
Such is not the law in Utah, nor sound corporate law at al l . For the p u r -
pose of this brief (but not as a matter of admission of ultimate fact) , it will b e 
assumed that Max W. Young was acting as the chief executive officer of the four 
defendant corporations which were operated at a profit. The matter becomes 
a bas ic legal i ssue to b e resolved by the court as to whether or not the directions 
of Mr. Wycoff, as extended through the terms of his Last Will and Testament, 
supersedes the powers of the Boards of Directors of the four corporations in 
which he was a stodkholder. The record wiU show that Mr. Wycoff was a majority 
stockholder in three of the said corporations, namely Wycoff Company, Incorporated, 
Wycoff Warehouse, I n c . , and Wycoff Corporation, and further that , though he 
had only one share of stock in Mountain Service, I n c . , such corporation was 
otherwise a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wycoff Company, Incorporated. Thus 
for all practical purposes Mr. Wycoff was a majority stockholder in the four corpora-
- Q Q -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t ions, a member of the Board of Directors and President of such corporations 
at time of his demise. 
The language of Article VIII of Mr. WycofPs Will makes no bequest of any 
stock to the plaintiff Max W. Young, but constitutes a directive to his t rus tees , 
should they elect to operate and preserve any corporations or businesses "which 
I may control at the time of my death." The critical language involved is: 
However, I direct my trustee to name Max W. Young, if he 
is then living and is then serving as an executive of said 
corporations or bus inesses , as the chief executive of said 
corporations or businesses so long as he discharges his office 
or offices with fidelity and so long as said corporations or 
businesses are operated at a profit. 
The stock in said corporations was first under the control of Zions, as 
the executor of the estate, and then was distributed to it as trustee under the 
Will of Mr. Wycoff. In that capacity it still holds the stock. However, at the 
time of the termination of employment of plaintiff Max W. Young, there were nine 
members of the Board of Directors of each of the corporations, and the management 
and control of the corporations were vested in the said Board of Directors. Zions, 
as Trus tee , had no vote on the Board of Directors, though four of its employees 
were members of said Board. Zions, as Trus tee , was a stockholder, and the * 
r ights of majority as well as minority stockholders are subject to the control 
and direction of the daily business by the Board of Directors. 
The basic issue then comes before the court as to whether or not the control 
of the corporation is in the Board of Directors, or whether the wishes expressed 
in the Will of a majority stockholder supersede that right and duty of control 
vested in the Board of Directors. Initially we must look at the Utah statute relating 
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to corporations and their management. Section 16-10-33 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
reads: 
The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed 
by the board of d i rectors . 
This has been affirmed by Utah cases over a long period of time, typical of which 
is the decision in Anderson v . Grantsville North Willow Irrigation C o . , 51 
Utah 137, 169 Pac. 168: 
Authority to manage and control corporation and conduct 
its business was left exclusively to board of directors and 
not to stockholders as such . 
This has never been changed by our Utah statutes nor changed by the decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Section 16-10-44 imposes certain liabilities upon directors in certain ca ses , 
which reflects that the responsibility is that of the directors to determine the 
course of events within the corporation, including the h i r ing and firing of personnel 
and the management of the affairs. The next section, 10-16-45, relates to officers, 
and prescr ibes that such: 
• . . • shall be elected by the board of directors at such time 
and in such manner as may be prescr ibed by the by- laws 
. . . Such other officers and assistant officers and agents 
deemed necessary may be appointed by the board of directors 
or chosen in such manner as may be prescr ibed by the b y -
laws . . . All officers and agents of the corporation as 
between themselves and the corporation shall have such 
authority and perform such duties in the management of 
the corporation as may be provided in the by- laws or as 
may be determined by resolution of the board of d i rec tors , 
not inconsistent with the by - l aws . 
The following section, 16-10-46, reads: 
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Any officer may be removed by the board of directors or 
by a committee, if any , if so authorized by the board of 
directors , whenever in its best judgment the best interest 
of the corporation will be served thereby, but such removal 
shall be without prejudice to the contract r igh ts , if any, of 
the person so removed. 
It is significant to observe that at no place in the Complaint nor in the 
evidence is there any allegation that Mr. Young had a contract with the company. 
He has been appointed as the President of the company, following the demise 
of Mr. M . S . Wycoff. His position as President made him the chief executive 
officer of the companies, bu t , as stated in Section 16-10-46, U.C.A. 1953: 
Any officer may be removed by the board of directors or 
by a committee, if any , if so authorized by the board of 
d i rectors , whenever in its judgment the best interests 
of the corporation will be served thereby. 
Were we to engage in a fantasy as to whether or not the Last Will of Mr. 
Wycoff created a contract for the benefit of Mr. Young, we believe that the very 
recitation of the same shows the compete fallacy thereof. A Will is not a contract 
in the circumstances here involved, where it is the single act of a living person 
that becomes effective as of the time of his demise. Thus it is merely a testamentary 
declaration by the then living person as to the descent of his property following 
his demise. It cannot be considered to be a thi rd-par ty beneficiary contract 
for the advantage of Mr. Young, because it was not a contract. There is nothing 
in the record to show that Mr. Young was aware of the contents of the Will and 
did anything to alter his circumstances in reliance thereon. 
Mr. Young has intermixed his claims and assert ions, apparently erroneously 
assuming that the power of appointment and the power of removal of an officer 
or employee of the corporation are lodged in Zions as Trustee of the Will of M. 
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S. Wycoff. That power of appointment and of removal are vested solely in the 
Boards of Directors of the corporations, and regardless of the wishes or pleas 
of a stockholder, the Board has the sole discretionary right and power to appoint 
or to discharge. We have carefully researched the cases in Utah relating to these 
matters and we find no case that goes against the s tatutes , or that interprets 
the statutes in such a way as to diminish the power of the Board of Directors 
to perform this vital and universally accepted function, namely of appointment 
and discharge of officers and employees. 
The issue of whether Mr. Young quit his positions or was discharged has 
been treated supra . Assuming solely for consideration of the issue claimed under 
Mr. Wycoff fs Will, that he was discharged by the Board of Directors , does Max 
Young then have an actionable cause against the corporations or against Zions? 
What would be the legal foundation of such an action? No estoppel is alleged 
and no contract is alleged or proven. 
The case cited by appellants to sustain the contention that Max Young had 
an ongoing r ight of employment as chief executive officer of the defendant com-
panies is In re Pittock's Will, 102 Ore . 159, 199 Pac. 633 (1921). This was 
decided under facts and statutes different than those in Utah, Apparently the 
trustees named in that Will were also Directors . Zions, as Trustee under Mr. 
Wycoff s Will, was not a Director of any of the corporations. Only four out of 
the nine directors were employed by Zions. The affirmative and unrelent ing 
dictate of the Utah statute imposing responsibility solely in the Board of Directors 
negatives any validity of the Oregon or other cases in our present situation. 
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There are only two ways by which Max W. Young could continue on as 
the chief executive officer of the corporations , and those are -
(a) By reason of a contract or Articles of Incorporation 
that accorded to him such a r ight , or 
(b) By reason of the affirmative action of the Board of 
Directors annually electing him to such an office. 
Neither of these basic and fundamental grounds exists and none has been alleged. 
The Board of Directors, by affirmative vote, has terminated his employment 
as chief executive officer, by accepting his de facto resignation, and this was 
by the unanimous vote of the Boards . 
The strong and unequivocal language in the Utah statutes vests the Board 
of Directors with full management powers , including the right to discharge any 
officer or employee, subject to his contract r igh t s . No Utah case apparently 
exists that involves the issue of whether of not one, such as Max W. Young, 
named in the Will to be chief executive officer, would have any recourse if d i s -
charged. However, a parallel situation was decided in D'Arcangelo v . D'Arcangelo, 
137 N . J . Eq. 63, 43 A(2d) 1969, adverse to Mr. Young's contentions. 
In the D?Arcangelo case, decedent's Will directed that his bro ther Federico 
be employed by the bus company so long as he was able to work. Decedent owned 
90% of the capital stock. There was no contract between the corporation and 
Federico, and the decision reads in part : 
A contract by the two sons , acting by virtue of their 
ownership of a majority of the outstanding stock, with 
Federico, would not bind the corporation, since our 
corporation law gives to the board of directors the power 
and duty of managing the business of the corporation. 
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R . S . 14: 7 -1 , N . J . S . A . Clement v . Young, e t c . , C o . , 
7 0 N . J . Eq. 677, 67A. 82, 118 Am. St. Rep. 747; Reed 
v . Trenton, 80 N . J . Eq. 503, 85 A. 270. In order to 
reach the conclusion that the testamentary clause which 
is under consideration is enforceable, I would have to 
hold that it imposes a continuing obligation on Samuel 
and Gilbert to vote for directors who will promise to 
engage Federico at the stated sa lary , whether or not 
the directors deem his employment to be advantageous 
to the corporation. Such an obligation, whether created 
by will or contract, is contrary to public policy, and the re -
fore it cannot b e enforced. 
In Page "The Law of Wills", Vol. I , 1U6.2, we find: 
It has been held that a will provision that a corporation, 
the stock of which belongs to the testator, shall continue 
to employ A, does not bind such corporation* 
As stated in Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. II 11353: 
If the term of an officer is not fixed by any contract b inding 
upon the corporation, nor by the charter or general law , 
he may be removed at any time, with or without cause , 
at the pleasure of the body appointing him, and no 
specific cause need b e assigned therefor. Thus a 
board of directors may remove the sec re ta ry- t reasure r 
elected by the board , where it holds for no fixed te rm, 
provided he was elected or appointed by the board of 
d i rec tors . The power of removal extends to all officers 
of the corporation, including the pres ident , t r ea su re r 
and general manager or superintendent. 
• * 
Mr. Young was elected by the Board as President , following Mr. Wycoff s 
demise, but for no fixed term. He has not asserted or alleged that he was d i s -
charged in violation of any provision of the Articles of Incorporation of the four 
Wycoff corporations, as no such provisions exist . Also, he has not asserted 
any contract or statutory r ight for continued employment as chief executive officer 
in defiance of the Board of Directors . He must succeed, if at a l l , only if the 
law in Utah takes away from the Boards of Directors the management of the corpora-
tions and the r ight to d ischarge , as set forth in Section 16-10-46, " . . . whenever 
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in its judgment the best intersts of the corporation will be served thereby." 
To place the wishes of Mr. Wycoff, as expressed by his Will in Article III, above 
the statutory rights and duties of the Board of Directors, would be in direct 
contravention of corporate law for the orderly operations under the statutes of Utah. 
Finally, as shown by the evidence, Max Young, in a fit of anger over appoint-
ment of a Controller, resigned his position as chief executive officer of the four 
companies. At page 43 of Appellants' Brief it is conceded, "it would be impractical 
for Max Young to resume office as the chief executive of the Wycoff companies." 
This is a realistic recognition that Mr. Wycoff by his Will made his only son, 
Bruce Wycoff, the sole beneficiary of the t rust as to all voting stock owned by 
Mr. Wycoff, and that now Bruce Wycoff is the General Manager of the companies. 
Thus the issues raised on appeal by this point have become moot. 
Based upon the evidence presented and the Findings of Fact, the trial 
court then made its Conclusions of Law. No. 36 reads: 
Based upon the facts presented, all attendant circumstances 
and a review of all of the evidence, the court finds that 
Max W. Young was not wrongfully discharged, and 
plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of proof in 
establishing this claim. 
Such Findings and Conclusions were based upon competent evidence and this 
Court should not disturb the same. 
POINT V. 
THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 26, 1965 RELATING 
TO "REDEMPTION" OF STOCK WAS UNENFORCEABLE 
AS TO VOTING STOCK AND OTHERWISE 
Appellants assert that it was e r ror for the trial court not to enforce an 
Agreement of April 26, 1965, as asserted by Appellants. The said Agreement 
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is a document drafted largely by Max Young in an effort by him to obtain control 
over the Wycoff companies. This is Exhibit 3-P, which relates to a policy of 
group life insurance which also covered Mr. M . S . Wycoff. The policy was taken 
after Mr„ Wycoff was afflicted by leukemia and the Agreement was sponsored 
by Max Young with foreknowledge of that fact. 
The face amount of the policy, $48,000.00 was paid to Mountain Service , 
Inc. , i ts beneficiary. However, Mountain Service was not a party to the April 
26, 1965 Agreement. It was signed by the three main stockholders, M. S. Wycoff, 
Max Young and C. Leland Clayton, and their wives . Mr. Wycoff signed for Bruce 
Wycoff, who was absent from the state and a minor at that t ime. It provides for 
use of insurance proceeds "to redeem, to the extent of such proceeds , the stock 
that each deceased First Party ( M . S . Wycoff, Max Young and L. Leland Clayton) 
owned in said four corporations at the time of his death." 
The problem which arose developed from the assertion by Max Young that 
the $48,000.00 paid by the insurance company to Mountain Service must be used 
to purchase voting stock in Wycoff Company, Incorporated from Zions as Executor 
and as Trus tee . No mention of voting stock is made in the Agreement. At the 
time of h is demise, M . S . Wycoff owned 6,122 shares of voting stock and 85,708 
shares of non-voting stock in Wycoff Company, Incorporated. 
The devious impact of redemption of only voting stock would b e to leave 
Max Young as the majority stockholder. As Appellants say in their brief (p . 
45): "Admittedly, the agreement is ambiguous with respect to the kind of stock 
contemplated for redemption." Zions, as Trustee under the M . S . Wycoff Will, 
-46-
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offered to exchange shares of stock, both voting and non-voting, on a pro-ra ta 
ba s i s , but refused to deliver up all of the voting stock as demanded by Max Young. 
There are a number of reasons why this Agreement is not enforceable, 
and why the trial court , in Finding No. 37, said: 
37. Based upon the facts presented, all attendant circum-
stances and a review of all of the evidence, the court finds 
that the agreement of April 26, 1965, did not contemplate 
the transfer of "voting stock," and plaintiffs failed to s u s -
tain their burden of proof in establishing this claim. 
It then made its Conclusion as to the April 26, 1965 Agreement, that it "was unen-
forceable and did not require the application of the insurance proceeds paid to 
Mountain Service, Inc. to redemption of voting stock of Wycoff Company , Incor-
porated, e . " 
Some of the compelling reasons why voting stock only should not be redeemed 
are: 
(a) The Agreement does not mention "voting" stock at any place; 
(b) If that makes it ambiguous, then it must be construed against 
Max Young, who prepared it; 
(c) The Agreement is testamentary in character and has not been 
executed in conformance with Utah law; 
(d) Mountain Service is not a party to the Agreement and the 
$48,000.00 was paid to it; 
(e) "Redemption" of stock contemplates an act by the issuer of 
the stock. M . S . Wycoff had only one share in Mountain Service which 
it might redeem; 
-47-
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(f) This demand of Max Young for transfer of the estateTs voting 
stock and his refusal to allow a pro- ra ta acquisition of both voting and 
non-voting stock would thwart the explicit provisions of the Will of M. S. 
Wycoff, wherein Trustee is directed to distribute voting stock to his 
son, Bruce; 
(g) The obvious advantage which Max Young sought to take 
of his benefactor, M . S . Wycoff, who was ill with leukemia, to the total 
disadvantage of Bruce Wycoff, makes the scheme inequitable; 
(h) Max Young was in a position of t rus t and confidence as to 
the Wycoffs and had betrayed his fiduciary responsibil i t ies, if this 
scheme of taking the voting stock away from them is allowed to stand; 
(i) When Max Young went to Mrs . Wycoff after he r husband fs 
demise to seek her signature on Exhibit P-4 (a directive to Zions to tu rn 
over the voting stock) , she refused to sign such, as she testified (Tr . 
452, Ab . 148): 
I could see without any great deal of study and certainly 
no hesitation, that what Mr. Young was proposing to do was 
— is exactly an opposite to the intent in my husband 's 
expressed wil l . 
Q. Did you communicate this understanding and your 
position to Mr. Young? 
A. I called him the next morning and told him that I would 
not and could not sign the paper because it was not my h u s -
band ' s intention. 
Appellants1 brief would lull the Court into accepting their proposal for 
redemption of voting stock by the innocuous assertion that Mountain Service 
was merefy a handy vehicle to assist the individuals . This veils the real thrust 
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of the selfish scheme being projected. Mountain Service is a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Wycoff Company. If the Wycoff family's voting stock were purchased or "redeemed" 
by Mountain Service, then such stock would be under control of Max Young, 
because he would b e left with a majority of the remaining voting stock in the 
parent corporation. We feel certain that this court will not be so misled. The 
trial Court, after seeing and hearing the witnesses , did not "buy" this outrageous 
plan to divest the Trust and in turn Mr. Wycoffs son, Bruce, of the prime asset 
of the whole estate for $48,000.00 of insurance money and not one cent from Max 
Young. It was Mr. Wycoffs intent to pass control to his son, Bruce, as stated 
in his Will. The provisions of the Will for voting stock control to be passed on 
to Mr. Wycoffs only child, Bruce Wycoff, are clear and unambiguous. 
Max Young, who was a donee of his stock from Mr. Wycoff, has sought 
by this redemption scheme to subvert the bas ic intention of the man who gave 
him an opportunity in bus iness , trained him in management, gave 25% of the 
stock to him in the three Wycoff companies and trusted him to be the interim manager 
until Bruce should come of age and be able to take over corporate responsibil i t ies. 
Max Young had the effrontery to testify to this court that if he got control he 
might let Bruce come back in at some unspecified future time, and if Bruce measured 
up to the "expectations" and unspecified standards to b e set solely by Max Young. 
What Bruce Wycoff would have to pay to buy from Max Young his way back into 
the family business is likewise unspecified. 
As is usual in matters of this k ind , machinations such as Mr. Young proposes 
at a later date do not coincide with the t rue intent of earlier y e a r s . Bruce Wycoff 
wanted to go to a graduate business school to prepare himself for the return to 
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the companies built by his father. He applied to three schools, Stanford, Harvard 
and Yale. Stanford did not accept him and he decided on Harvard because it 
has classes in transportation. Obviously he was thinking of taking over the 
control of the transportation businesses built by his then-deceased father. 
The application to Stanford University required a letter of recommendation. 
His father had just died, so Bruce turned to Max Young for such a letter. Bruce 
Wycoff testified that when he came back to Salt Lake City at the end of his regular 
school te rm, he went to the office of Max Young to find out what sort of a letter 
had been written to Stanford. He there received a copy. (Exhibit D-21) As 
quoted above, Max Young wrote: 
Bruce Wycoff . . . has a tremendous business opportunity 
ahead of him, in that he has available the administrative 
and financial control of a motor car r ier organization 
serving eight states in the Intermountain area which his 
father developed, and as the only he i r , Bruce will eventually 
receive. 
This letter was written at a time when apparently the greedy idea of sub -
ver t ing the intentions of his benefactor, M . S . Wycoff, was not uppermost in 
the mind of Max Young. Nothing more need be said on th i s , as the Stanford letter 
clearly reflects the intent. Max Young had no right to demand that the estate 
su r rende r i ts voting stock in Wycoff Company, Incorporated so as to hand control 
of the companies to Max Young. 
Max Young takes diverse and inconsistent positions from time to time. 
In dealing with his purportedly improper discharge and oppressive conduct 
phases , he says that the shareholdings of the estate of M. S. Wycoff represented 
by Zions as Executor represented a clear majority of the stock of the companies. 
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Without such assert ion, there could be no "oppression" by the majority shareholders 
as against the minority, Max Young. Later he asserts that the April 26, 1965 
Agreement automatically divested Zions, as Executor, of the majority of the 
stock of Wycoff Company, Incorporated, thus leaving Max Young as the majority 
shareholder. 
It is submitted that the 1965 Agreement is a testamentary document and 
hence unenforceable. In all event, it is not self executing. Fur ther , it is ambiguous 
as to the subject matter of "stock" embraced therein , and such ambiguity must 
b e construed against the extreme self-serving interpretation of Max Young (the 
author of the document) that it embraces only voting stock. The agreement fails 
as unenforceale for this reason also. The Agreement did not divest the Executor 
and the estate of any stock, and it is so drafted that it cannot b e enforced by 
this court as against Mountain Service, which received the insurance proceeds , 
or against Zions as Executor, This phase of the appellants' lawsuit must fail 
completely. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants, who were recipients of minority shares of stock, mostly by 
gifts from M . S . Wycoff, have been treated fairly at all t imes. Max Young received 
every consideration from the Wycoff organizations and from the Wycoff estate, 
and he received his proportionate share of all stock distr ibutions. The trial 
of this matter involved much testimony and the introduction of many exhibits . 
The trial judge , after due consideration and having the case under advisement 
- 5 1 -
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for several months , resolved the issues against Appellants. Every Finding and 
Conclusion of the court below is supported by competent and substantial evidence, 
and is founded in said principles of law . It is submitted that the judgment of 
the lower court in all part iculars should be affirmed. 
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